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Chapter 2
Michel Foucault: A ''Young Conservative''?

In a recent discussion of postmodernism, Jürgen Habermas referred to Michel Foucault as a ''Young Conservative.''[1] This epithet was an allusion to the ''conservative revolutionaries'' of interwar Weimar Germany, a group of radical, antimodernist intellectuals whose numbers included Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, and Hans Freyer. To call Foucault a ''Young Conservative,'' then, was to accuse him of elaborating what Habermas calls a ''total critique of modernity.'' Such a critique, according to Habermas, is both theoretically paradoxical and politically suspect. It is theoretically paradoxical because it cannot help but surreptitiously presuppose some of the very modern categories and attitudes it claims to have surpassed. And it is politically suspect because it aims less at a dialectical resolution of the problems of modern societies than at a radical rejection of modernity as such. In sum, it is Habermas's contention that although Foucault's critique of contemporary culture and society purports to be postmodern, it is at best modern and at worst antimodern.[2]

As Habermas sees it, then, the issue between him and Foucault concerns their respective stances vis-à-vis modernity. Habermas locates his own stance in the tradition of dialectical social criticism that runs from Marx to the Frankfurt school. This tradition analyzes modernization as a two-sided historical process and insists that although Enlightenment rationality dissolved premodern forms of domination and unfreedom, it gave rise to new and insidious forms of its own. The important thing about this tradition, from Habermas's point of view, and the thing that sets it apart from the rival tradition in which he locates Foucault is that it does not reject *in toto* the modern ideals and aspirations whose two-sided ac-

tualization it criticizes. Instead, it seeks to preserve and extend both the "emancipatory impulse" behind the Enlightenment and that movement's real success in overcoming premodern forms of domination—even while it criticizes the bad features of modern societies.

This, however, claims Habermas, is not the stance of Foucault. Foucault belongs rather to a tradition of rejectionist criticism of modernity, one which includes Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the French poststructuralists. These writers, unlike the dialecticians with whom Habermas identifies, aspire to a total break with the Enlightenment. In their zeal to be as radical as possible, they "totalize" critique so that it turns against itself. Not content to criticize the contradiction between modern norm and modern reality, they criticize even the constitutive norms of modernity, rejecting the very commitments to truth, rationality, and freedom that alone make critique possible.

What are we to make of this highly charged attack on the most political of the French poststructuralists by the leading exponent of German Critical Theory?

On the one hand, Habermas's criticism of Foucault directs our attention to some very important questions: Where does Foucault stand vis-à-vis the political ideals of the Enlightenment? Does he reject the project of examining the background practices and institutions that structure the possibilities of social life in order to bring them under the conscious, collective control of human beings? Does he reject the conception of freedom as autonomy that that project appears to presuppose? Does he aspire to a total break with the long-standing Western tradition of emancipation via rational reflection?

But, on the other hand, even as Habermas's criticism directs our attention to such questions, it tends not to solicit the sort of inquiry that is needed to answer them. In fact, Habermas's formulation is too tendentious to permit a fair adjudication of the issues. It overlooks the possibility that the target of Foucault's critique may not be modernity *simpliciter* but, rather, only one particular component of it: namely, a system of practice and discourse that Foucault calls "humanism." Moreover, it begs an important question by assuming that one cannot reject humanism without also rejecting modernity. Finally, it jumps the gun with the alarmist supposition that if Foucault rejects a "universalistic" or foundationalistic metainterpretation of humanist concepts and values, then he must be rejecting these concepts and values entirely.

All told, then, Habermas raises the ante too precipitously and forecloses the possibility of posing to Foucault a more nuanced and analytically precise set of questions: Assuming that Foucault's target is indeed "humanism," then what exactly is it, and what is its relation to modernity more broadly conceived? Does Foucault really mean to reject humanism, and if so, then on what grounds? Does he reject it, for example, on strictly conceptual and philosophical grounds? Is the problem that the humanist vocabulary is still mired in a superseded Cartesian metaphysic? Or, rather, does Foucault reject humanism on strategic grounds? In other words, does he contend that though a humanist political stance may once have had emancipatory force when it was a matter of opposing the premodern forms of domination of the *ancien régime,* this is no longer the case? Does he thus think, strategically, that appeals to humanist values in the present conjuncture must fail to discourage—indeed, must promote—new, quintessentially modern forms of domination? Or, finally, does Foucault reject humanism on normative grounds? Does he hold that the humanist project is intrinsically undesirable? Is humanism, in his view, simply a formula for domination *tout court?*

If Habermas is to be faulted for failing to ask such questions, then Foucault must be faulted for failing to answer them. In fact, his position is highly ambiguous: on the one hand, he never directly pronounces in favor of rejectionism as an alternative to dialectical social criticism; but, on the other hand, his writings abound with rhetorical devices that convey rejectionist attitudes. Moreover, given his general reluctance to spell out the theoretical presuppositions informing his work, it is not surprising that Foucault fails to distinguish among the various sorts of rejectionism I've just outlined. On the contrary, he tends to conflate conceptual, strategic, and normative arguments against humanism.

These ambiguities have given rise to an interesting divergence among Foucault's interpreters, one that bears directly on the controversy sparked by Habermas. Because Foucault's texts contain stretches of philosophical, historical, and political reasoning that are susceptible to various rejectionist interpretations and because the conceptual, strategic, and normative dimensions of these are not adequately distinguished, interpreters have tended to seize on one or another of these elements as the key to the whole. David Hoy, for example, has interpreted Foucault as, in my terms, a merely conceptual or philosophical rejectionist of humanism;[3] other readers have taken or are likely to take him to be, again in my terms, a merely strategic rejectionist of humanism; and Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow have put the strongest construction of all on Foucault, reading him as, in my terms, a substantive, normative rejectionist of humanist values.[4] These, I believe, are the major, prototypical interpretations of Foucault now extant. Only by closely examining them can we hope to get to the bottom of the "Young Conservative" controversy.

In what follows, I shall consider each of these three interpretations of Foucault. I shall not be directly concerned, however, with the question, Who has got Foucault right? I believe that Foucault does not really have a single consistent position and that there is some textual evidence in favor of each reading; moreover, I do not wish here to debate where I think the balance of such evidence lies. My primary concern will be the substantive issues between Foucault and Habermas. I shall try to formulate these issues more precisely and persuasively than I think Habermas has done and to begin adjudicating them. My focus, then, will be the following problem: Which, if any, of the various sorts of rejectionism that

can be attributed to Foucault are desirable and defensible alternatives to the sort of dialectical social criticism Habermas envisions?

1

One influential reading of Foucault is premised on the assumption that—*pace* Habermas—to reject a foundationalistic or universalistic metaphilosophical interpretation of the humanist ideals of modernity is not necessarily to reject modernity altogether. In this reading, a version of which has been expounded by David Hoy, Foucault is a merely philosophical rejectionist: he rejects only a certain philosophical framework, not necessarily the values and forms of life that that framework has served to underpin and legitimate.[5] Furthermore, this reading holds that such a position is defensible; Foucault is perfectly consistent in repudiating the Cartesian vocabulary in which humanist ideals have been articulated while retaining something like the substance of the ideals themselves.

Those who read Foucault in this way follow Dreyfus and Rabinow in seeing him as a Heideggerian of sorts, allegedly completing and concretizing Heidegger's program for the dismantling of Cartesianism.[6] Heidegger argued that the subject and object that modern philosophy (including political philosophy) took for necessary, universal, and ahistorical fundaments were actually contingent, historically situated products of the modern interpretation of the meaning of Being.[7] As such, they pertained only to one "epoch" in the "history of Being" (i.e., Western civilization), an epoch that had exhausted its possibilities and was ending. That these Cartesian interpretations of Being were contingent and derivative was evident in view of their relativity to and dependence on a prior, enabling background that remained necessarily "unthought" by them. For a variety of logical, historical, and quasi-political reasons, Heidegger thought that this background could be evoked only indirectly and metaphorically via words like *Lichtung* ("clearing").

Foucault is seen, accordingly, as continuing and concretizing Heidegger's delimitation of Cartesianism by spelling out what Heidegger might have or should have meant by the background, or *Lichtung*. The background is the historically specific system of norm-governed social practices (at first called the "episteme," later the "power/knowledge regime") that defines and produces each epoch's distinctive subjects and objects of knowledge and power. A new kind of historiography (first called "archaeology," later "genealogy") can chart the emergence and disappearance of such systems of practice and describe their specific functioning. Such historiography can illuminate the transitory character of any given episteme or power/knowledge regime, including, and especially, the modern humanist one. It can function as a kind of *Kulturkritik,* dereifying contemporary practices and objects, robbing them of their traditional ahistorical, foundationalistic legitimations, lending them an appearance of arbitrariness and

even nastiness, and suggesting their potential openness to change. It can demonstrate, for example, that the Cartesian concepts of subjectivity and objectivity that have served to legitimate humanist values are "fictions" and that these fictions and the values correlated with them have in turn served to legitimate practices that, denuded of their aura of legitimacy, take on an unsavory appearance.

In this reading, Foucault follows Heidegger in singling out a constellation both call "humanism" as a target for genealogical critique and delimitation. Heidegger argued that in the development of modern Western culture since Descartes, a complex and disastrous complicity has been elaborated between the subjectivity and the objectivity that humanism simplistically opposes to each other.[8] On the one hand, modern mathematical science and machine technology have objectified everything that is (the first taking as real only what can be fitted into a preestablished research ground plan; the second treating everything as "standing reserve," or resources to be mobilized within a technological grid). But on the other hand, and at the same time, the "age of anthropology" has created a realm of subjectivities; it has given rise to such entities as "representations," "values," "cultural expressions," "life objectivations," "aesthetic and religious experience," the mind that thinks the research plan and its objects, and the will that wills the mobilization of standing reserve. This objectification and this subjectification, says Heidegger, are two sides of the same coin. Humanists are at best naive and at worst complicit in thinking they can solve the problems of modern culture by asserting the dominance of the subject side over the object side. Ontologically, the two are exactly on the same (non-"primordial" and "forgetful") level; ethically—the very notion of ethics is part of the problem. But, says Heidegger, none of this is meant to sponsor the glorification of the inhumane; it is aimed, rather, at finding a higher sense of the dignity of "man" than that envisioned by humanism.[9]

Those who emphasize Heidegger's influence stress Foucault's account of the modern discursive formation of humanism. Humanism, claims Foucault, is a political and scientific praxis oriented to a distinctive object known as "Man."[10] Man came into existence only in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century, with the emergence of a new power/knowledge regime. Within and by means of the social practices that regime comprises, Man was and is constituted as the epistemic object of the new "human sciences" and also instituted as the subject who is the target and instrument of a new kind of normalizing power. Both as epistemic object and as subject of power, Man is a strange, unstable, two-sided entity, or "doublet." He consists in an impossible symbiosis of two opposing poles, one objective, the other subjective. Each of these poles seeks to exclude the other but, in so doing, manages only to solicit and enhance it, since each in fact requires the other. Humanism, then, is the contradictory, ceaseless, self-defeating project of resolving this Man problem.

In *The Order of Things,* Foucault provides a grid for the varieties of modern humanism by identifying three forms of the Man doublet. First, there is the transcendental/empirical double, in which Man both constitutes the world of empirical objects and is constituted himself, an empirical object like any other in the world. Second, there is the cogito/unthought double, in which Man is both determined by forces unknown to him and aware that he is so determined; he is thus charged with the task of thinking his own unthought and thereby freeing himself. Finally, there is the return-and-retreat-of-the-origin double, in which Man is both the originary opening from which history unfolds and an object with a history that antedates him.

Each of these three doubles contains a subject pole that suggests the autonomy, rationality, and infinite value of Man. As the one who transcendentally constitutes the world, Man is a meaning giver and lawmaker. As thinker of his own unthought, he becomes self-transparent, unalienated, and free. And as enabling horizon of history, he is its measure and destiny. But no sooner does this subject pole endow Man with this privilege and value than it defines the opposing object pole that denies them. As empirical object, Man is subject to prediction and control. Unknown to himself, he is determined by alien forces. And as a being with a history that antedates him, he is encumbered with a density not properly his own.

The humanist political project, then, is that of solving the Man problem. It is the project of making the subject pole triumph over the object pole, of achieving autonomy by mastering the other in history, in society, in oneself, of making substance into subject. Foucault's claim, both in *The Order of Things* and throughout his subsequent writings, is that this project, premised as it is on the "subjected sovereignty" of Man, is self-defeating, self-contradictory, and can lead in practice only to domination. Only a completely new configuration—a posthumanist one that no longer produces this bizarre Man doublet but, rather, some completely different object—offers a way out.

The reading of Foucault as a merely philosophical rejectionist takes the writings after *The Order of Things* as working out the social implications of the philosophical critique of humanism. *Discipline and Punish* is seen as chronicling the fabrication of the object side of Man; the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* and shorter pieces like "Truth and Subjectivity" chronicle the fabrication of the subject side.[11] Whereas a humanist might be expected to criticize the objectification of Man in the name of subjectivity, Foucault's work on sexuality putatively shows that subjectivity is every bit as problematic as objectivity. Indeed, the complicity and symmetry of the two poles is dramatically revealed in two other works, *Pierre Rivière* and *Herculine Barbin*.[12] In each of these books, Foucault juxtaposes the first-person subjective discourse of an individual (in the first, a nineteenth-century French parricide; in the second, a nineteenth-century French hermaphrodite) to the contemporary objective medical and legal discourses about him or her. Although he never explicitly clarified his intentions in these books, it seems safe to assume that Foucault's aim is not the humanist one of vindicating the subjective discourse over against the objective one. On the contrary, it must be the antihumanist aim of placing the two on a par, of showing that they depend on and require each other, that they are generated together within, and are illustrative of, the discursive formation of modern humanism.

When Foucault's works are read in this way, it is possible to treat his rejection of humanism as merely conceptual or philosophical. Just as Heidegger's delimitation of humanism was intended to enhance rather than to undermine human dignity, so Foucault's critique, *pace* Habermas, is not an attack on the notions of freedom and reason per se. It is rather a rejection of one contingent, superseded philosophical idiom or discursive formation in which those values have lately found their expression. What is novel and important in Foucault's social criticism, in this reading, is not its implied normative content—*that,* for all practical purposes, is "humanistic" in some looser sense. The novelty is rather the scrapping of the classical modern philosophical underpinnings of that content. Foucault has succeeded in producing a species of *Kulturkritik* that does not rely on—indeed, that explicitly repudiates—the subject-object framework in all of its familiar guises. He rejects the notion of progress—not only in its self-congratulatory Whiggish form but also in the more critical and sophisticated form in which it appears in Marxism and some versions of German Critical Theory. Thus, he produces genuine indictments of objectionable aspects of modern culture without presupposing a Hegelian teleology and a unitary subject of history. Similarly, he rejects the distinction between "real" and "administered" needs or interests, where the former are presumed to be grounded in something more than a contingent, historical power/knowledge regime or background of social practices. He is able, consequently, to condemn objectionable practices without presupposing the notion of autonomous subjectivity. Thus, David Hoy treats Foucault's explicitly political works—*Discipline and Punish* and the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*—as demonstrations of the dispensability of these anachronistic and questionable notions.[13] Foucault has shown that one does not need humanism in order to criticize prisons, social science, pseudoprograms for sexual liberation, and the like; that humanism is not the last word in critical social and historical writing; that there is life—and critique—after Cartesianism. One need not fear that in giving up the paradoxical and aporetic subject-object framework, one is giving up also and necessarily the possibility of engaged political reflection.

This reading of Foucault as a merely philosophical rejectionist is attractive. It suggests the possibility of combining something like Heidegger's and Foucault's postmodernism in philosophy with something like Habermas's modernism in politics. It thereby holds out the appealing promise that one can have one's cake and eat it, too. One gives up the foundationalistic metainterpretation of humanist

values: the view that such values are grounded in the nature of something (Man, the subject) independent of, and more enduring than, historically changing regimes of social practices. One gives up as well the idiom in which humanist values have had their classical modern expression: the terms 'autonomy', 'subjectivity', and 'self-determination' lose their privilege. But one does not give up the substantial critical core of humanism. What Habermas would call its "emancipatory force" remains. One simply uses other rhetorical devices and strategies to do essentially the same critical work that the humanist tried to do—namely, to identify and condemn those forms of modern discourse and practice that, under the guise of promoting freedom, extend domination.

Aside from the question of the fidelity of this reading, is the project it attributes to Foucault a defensible and desirable one? I take it that a merely philosophical rejection of humanism is defensible and desirable in principle. It is very much on the current political-philosophical agenda, as can be seen from a wide variety of recent work: for example, analytic accounts of the concept of autonomy by John Rawls and Gerald Dworkin;[14] antifoundationalist reconstructions of liberalism by Richard Rorty and Michael Walzer;[15] antihumanist versions of Marxism inspired by Louis Althusser;[16] and deconstructive reconceptualizations of "the political" by French philosophers influenced by Derrida.[17] Even portions of Habermas's work can be seen as a (moderate) version of this project: his "communicative" reconstruction of Kantian ethics, for example, is an attempt to divest the humanist notion of autonomy of some of its Cartesian trappings (its "monologism" and its ahistorical formalism) while preserving its efficacy as an instrument of social criticism; his distinction between evolution and history is an attempt to disencumber humanism of the Hegelian presupposition of a metaconstitutive subject of history; and his "linguistic turn" is an attempt to detach humanism from the standpoint of the philosophy of consciousness.

But to endorse in principle the general program of de-Cartesianizing and de-Hegelianizing humanism is not yet to resolve a great many very important and difficult problems. It is only to begin to spell out the tasks and standards in terms of which a Foucauldian merely philosophical rejection of humanism is to be evaluated. Among these tasks and standards, I believe, is the adequacy of what Foucault has to say in response to the following sort of metaethical question: Supposing one abandons a foundationalist grounding of humanist values, then to what sort of nonfoundationalist justification can such values lay claim? This, however, is a question Foucault has never squarely faced; rather, he has tried to displace it by insinuating that values neither can have nor require any justification. And yet he has not provided compelling reasons for embracing that extreme metaethical position.

This puts Foucault in the paradoxical position of being unable to account for or justify the sorts of normative political judgments he makes all the time—for example, that "discipline" is a bad thing. Moreover, it raises the question as to

whether the values implicit in his unabashedly value-laden descriptions of social reality would, if rendered explicit, constitute a coherent and consistent first-order normative outlook. That question is especially pressing, since Foucault has never, despite repeated insinuations, successfully argued that a coherent first-order normative outlook is dispensable in social criticism (see Chapter 1 of this volume).

But the problems that arise when we read Foucault as propounding a merely philosophical rejection of humanism run still deeper. Even if we absolve him of the onus of producing an acceptable moral theory, we may still question whether he has produced a satisfactory nonhumanist political rhetoric, one that does indeed do, and do better, the critical work that humanist rhetoric sought to do. We may question, for example, whether Foucault's rhetoric really does the job of distinguishing better from worse regimes of social practices; whether it really does the job of identifying forms of domination (or whether it overlooks some and/or misrecognizes others); whether it really does the job of distinguishing fruitful from unfruitful, acceptable from unacceptable forms of resistance to domination; and finally, whether it really does the job of suggesting not simply that change is possible but also what sort of change is desirable (see Chapter 3 of this volume). These, I take it, are among the principal tasks of social criticism, and they are tasks with respect to which Foucault's social criticism might well be judged deficient.

It is worth recalling that the reading of Foucault as a merely philosophical rejectionist of humanism included the claim that he had succeeded in producing a species of *Kulturkritik* without relying on Cartesian underpinnings. But that claim now seems open to question. We should conclude, then, that however laudable the general project, Foucault's version of merely philosophical rejectionism, or the version that has been attributed to him by readers like David Hoy, is incomplete and hence unsatisfactory. It tends, as a result, to invite the assumption that in Foucault's work one is dealing with a rejectionism of a stronger sort.

2

A second reading of Foucault holds that in addition to rejecting humanism on philosophical grounds, he also rejects it on strategic grounds. This reading offers a correspondent understanding of Foucault's position: it contends that he sees humanism as a political rhetoric and practice that developed at the beginning of the modern era in order to oppose what were essentially premodern forms of domination and oppression. Its targets were things like monarchical absolutism, the use of torture to extort confessions from criminals, and spectacular, cruel public executions. In opposition to such practices, humanism sought to limit assaults on people's bodies; it proclaimed a new respect for inwardness, personhood, humanity, and rights. However, the result was not the abolition of domination but, rather, the replacement of premodern forms of domination with new, quintessen-

tially modern ones. The new concern for 'humaneness' fed into the development of a powerful battery of social science technologies that massively transformed and vastly extended the scope and penetration of social control. The astonishing growth and near-ubiquitous spread of these techniques amounted to a revolution in the very nature of power in modern culture. The operation of power was so thoroughly transformed as to render humanism irrelevant and *dépassé*. The democratic safeguards forged in the struggle against premodern despotism have no force against the new modes of domination. Talk of rights and the inviolability of the person is of no use when the enemy is not the despot but the psychiatric social worker. Indeed, such talk and associated reform practice only make things worse. Humanism, then, must be rejected on strategic as well as philosophical grounds. In the current situation, it is devoid of emancipatory force.

This reading gives great weight to the argument of *Discipline and Punish*. There, Foucault chronicles the emergence of the "norm" and its replacement of the "law" as the primary instrument of modern social control. This change came about, he claims, as a result of the development of a new power/knowledge regime that produced a new subject and object of knowledge and a new target of power, namely, Man. Whereas an earlier regime had produced a knowledge of overt actions (crimes or sins) and a power whose target was bodies, the new regime sought to know and to discipline character, or the "soul." This new power/knowledge object was a deeper one: it was the sensibility or personality that underlay overt actions, the self or set of dispositions that was the ground or cause of those actions. Its very temporality was different; it persisted well beyond the more ephemeral actions that were its mere outward expressions. Hence, the knowledge of this object had a fundamentally different structure, and the production of such knowledge employed fundamentally different techniques. Along with Man, the "human sciences" were born. These sciences investigated the laws governing the formation, perseverance, and alteration of sensibility. They produced character typologies and classifications of "souls." They constituted individuals as "cases" and treated their overt actions as manifest signs of latent realities. Such signs had to be deciphered so that the particular "nature" of the individual in question could be determined—then his or her acts could be explained by that nature. Furthermore, once the laws governing a particular nature were known, prescriptions for altering it could be devised. Selves could be reprogrammed, old habits dismantled, and new ones inculcated in their place. Moreover, individualizing knowledges were complemented by synoptical ones. Statistical methods for surveying and assessing masses of population were developed. Statistical norms were formulated that made it possible to locate individuals on a commensurating scale. From the standpoint of social control, the relevant categories ceased to be the old-fashioned juridical ones of guilt and innocence. Instead, they became the social science ones of normalcy and deviancy. Henceforth, the world came to be populated less by malefactors than by "deviants," "perverts," and "delinquents."

Discipline and Punish thus describes the emergence and character of a new, distinctively modern form of power: normalizing-disciplinary power. It is the sort of power more appropriate to the bureaucratic welfare state than to the despotic regimes opposed by humanism. It is a power that operates quietly and unspectacularly but, for all that, continuously, penetratingly, and ubiquitously. It has no easily identifiable center but is "capillary," dispersed throughout the entire social body. Its characteristic agents are social scientists, expert witnesses, social workers, psychiatrists, teachers, progressive penologists, and the lay citizen who internalizes its categories and values. Above all, it is a power against which humanism is defenseless.

The reading of Foucault now under consideration takes him, then, to be rejecting humanism on strategic as well as on philosophical grounds. He is arguing, it is claimed, that the notions of subjectivity, autonomy, and selfhood to which the humanist appeals are in fact integral components of the disciplinary regime. Far from being genuinely critical, oppositional ideals with emancipatory force, they are actually the very norms and objects through which discipline operates. Selves and subjects in the proper sense came into existence only when the modern power/knowledge regime did. The humanist critic who appeals to them is thus not in a position to oppose that regime effectively. On the contrary, she or he is trapped in the doubling movement that defines the "age of Man."

Is this view defensible? The argument of *Discipline and Punish* consists in one extended historical example: the eighteenth-century European penal reform movement. This movement sought to end the *ancien régime*'s practice of torturing bodies and to replace it with a penal practice aimed at the criminal's mind. It would reorder the offender's mental representations in order to provoke self-reflection and enlightenment, thus rehabilitating the malefactor as an agent and subject. But, claims Foucault, humanist reform never materialized; it was immediately transformed into a normalizing, disciplinary mode of punishment in which the criminal was made the object of a technology of causal reconditioning.

There are obvious logical reasons to doubt that this argument establishes that humanism should be rejected on strategic grounds. It extrapolates from one case, over a hundred years old, to the general conclusion that the humanist conception of freedom as autonomy is today without critical force with respect to disciplinary institutions.

Moreover, a closer look at this case reveals an important new wrinkle. Foucault's account implies that the humanist penal reform movement contained a significant ambiguity. It was unclear whether the new object of punishment, the criminal's "mind" or "humanity," meant the capacity to choose rationally and freely (roughly, the capacities attributed by Kant to the noumenal self) or the causally conditioned seat or container of representations (roughly, the self posited

by associationist psychology with the properties attributed by Kant to the empirical self). The result was that it was unclear whether the project of restoring the juridical subject meant provoking a process of *self*-reflection whereby the criminal would undergo *self*-change, a project that would require adopting vis-à-vis the criminal what Habermas calls "the stance of communicative interaction" (or dialogic persuasion), or whether it meant redoing the association of ideas via cognitive conditioning, a project that would mean adopting what Habermas calls "the stance of strategic action" (or technological control). Foucault's account suggests that the penal reform movement conflated these two objects and their corresponding projects and action orientations and so, in effect, contained within itself the seeds of discipline. It posited, at least in embryo, objectified, predictable, and manipulable Man, thus effectively opening the door to the behavioral engineers and welfare technologists.

But if this is so, then what the argument of *Discipline and Punish* discredits is not a proper humanism at all but, rather, some hybrid form resembling utilitarianism. (Nor should this surprise, given that the archvillain of the book is Jeremy Bentham, inventor of the Panopticon.) Thus, it does not follow that a nonutilitarian, Kantian, or quasi-Kantian humanism lacks critical force against the psychological conditioning and mind manipulation that are the real targets of Foucault's critique of disciplinary power. Recall that Habermas has devised a version of Kantian humanism that goes at least some of the way toward meeting the philosophical objections considered in the previous section of this essay.[18] He has elaborated a pragmatic reinterpretation of Kant's ethics, one that divorces the autonomy-heteronomy contrast from the vestiges of the foundational subject-object ontology it retained in Kant and that pegs it instead to the pragmatic distinction between communicative interaction and strategic action. This move strengthens the normative, critical force of the autonomy notion against discipline. It effectively condemns strategic action irrespective of whether the object of punishment be a body or a "soul" or a "self."

It seems plausible to me to follow this Habermassian line and still allow that Foucault is right to contend that in the context of punishment the outcome of Enlightenment penal reform was not merely contingent. It does indeed seem doubtful that the project of reaching agreement with a criminal, of positing her or him as an autonomous subject of conversation, could ever in fact be anything other than manipulation and control of linguistic behavior, given that *ex hypothesi* it is to be carried out in the quintessentially non-"ideal speech situation" of involuntary incarceration. The same may also hold for women in the bourgeois patriarchal family, students in institutions of compulsory education, patients in mental asylums, soldiers in the military—indeed, for all situations where the power that structures discourse is hierarchical and asymmetrical and where some persons are prevented from pressing their claims either by overt or covert force or by such

structural features as the lack of an appropriate vocabulary for interpreting their needs.

But the fact that the humanist ideal of autonomous subjectivity is unrealizable, even co-optable, in such "disciplinary" contexts need not be seen as an argument against that ideal. It may be seen, rather, as an argument against hierarchical, asymmetrical power. One need not conclude, with Foucault, that humanist ideals must be rejected on strategic grounds. One may conclude instead, with Habermas, that it is a precondition for the realization of those ideals that the "power" that structures discourse be symmetrical, nonhierarchical, and hence reciprocal. Indeed, one may reinterpret the notion of autonomy so as to incorporate this insight, as Habermas has done. For him, autonomy ceases to refer to a "monologic" process of will formation wherein an isolated individual excludes all empirical needs, desires, and motives and considers only what is required by pure formal reason. Autonomy refers rather to an ideal "dialogic" process wherein individuals with equal right and power to question prevailing norms seek consensus through conversation about which of their apparently individual empirical needs and interests are in fact generalizable. In this interpretation, the cases of disciplinary domination described by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* are instances not of autonomy but of heteronomy precisely because they involve modes of discourse production that do not meet the procedural requirements specified by the "ideal speech situation."

Furthermore, it is worth noting that any strategic argument against humanism depends on complex empirical considerations. The antihumanist must demonstrate that the actual character of the contemporary world really is such as to render humanism irrelevant and *dépassé*. She or he must show, for example, that it really is the modern bureaucratic welfare state and not other forms of repression or oppression that constitutes the chief threat to freedom in our era. For even a "utilitarian-humanist" can argue that, with all of its problems, the "carceral" society described in *Discipline and Punish* is better than the dictatorship of the party-state, junta, or Imam; that, *pace* Foucault, the reformed prison is preferable to the gulag, the South African or Salvadoran torture cell, and Islamic "justice"; and that in *this* world—which is the real world—humanism still wields its share of critical, emancipatory punch.

Moreover, for nonutilitarian humanists like Habermas, the continuing strategic relevance of humanism is broader still. It is not confined to the critique of premodern forms of domination but applies equally to more modern "disciplinary" forms of power.

3

There is yet another way of reading Foucault that remains to be considered. This way takes him to be rejecting humanism not simply on conceptual and/or strate-

gic grounds but, rather, on substantive normative grounds. It holds that Foucault believes that humanism is intrinsically undesirable, that the conception of freedom as autonomy is a formula for domination *tout court*. Furthermore, some exponents of this line of interpretation, such as Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, claim that Foucault is right to reject humanism on normative grounds.[19]

This reading is or ought to be the real target of Habermas's attack, for it denies that his pragmatic, dialogic reconceptualization of autonomy meets Foucault's objections. Habermas's point would have weight, it is claimed, if Foucault were merely arguing that discipline is the use of social science in utilitarian programs aimed at normalizing deviancy in contexts of asymmetrical or hierarchical power and that humanism is inefficacious against it. In fact, however, he is arguing a much stronger thesis. Foucault is claiming that even a perfectly realized autonomous subjectivity would be a form of normalizing, disciplinary domination.

This reading depends heavily on Foucault's more recent work: the first volume of his *History of Sexuality* and the lecture "Truth and Subjectivity", which previews the direction pursued in the subsequent volumes of the *History*.[20] These texts are seen as doing for the subject side of the Man doublet what *Discipline and Punish* did for the object side. They provide a genealogical account of the fabrication of the hermeneutical subject, a subject that is not the empirical, causally conditioned container of representations but, rather, the putatively free, quasi-noumenal subject of communicative interaction. Foucault demonstrates, it is claimed, that far from providing a standpoint for emancipation, the fabrication of this subject only seals Man's domination. The subjectification of Man is in reality his subjection.

This reading correctly notes that Foucault's later work focuses on a host of subjectifying practices. Central among these are those quintessentially humanist forms of discourse that aim at liberation and self-mastery via the thematization and critique of previously unthematized, uncriticized contents of the self: unarticulated desires, thoughts, wishes, and needs. Foucault seeks the origins of the notion that by hermeneutical decipherment of the deep, hidden meaning of such contents, one can achieve lucidity about the other in oneself and thus master it and become free. He traces the career of this notion from its beginnings in Stoic self-examination and early Christian penance to its modern variants in psychoanalysis and the allegedly pseudoradical politics of sexual liberation. Foucault aims to show that "truth is not naturally free," that it took centuries of coercion and intimidation to "breed a confessing animal."[21]

Certainly, early forms of hermeneutical subjectification involved the sort of asymmetrical, hierarchical distribution of power in which a silent authority commanded, judged, deciphered, and eventually absolved the confessional discourse and its author. But the reading now under consideration holds that Foucault does not assume that asymmetry and hierarchy are of the essence of disciplinary power. Nor does he believe, it is claimed, that they are what is most objectionable

about it. On the contrary, one can imagine a perfected disciplinary society in which normalizing power has become so omnipresent, so finely attuned, so penetrating, interiorized, and subjectified, and therefore so invisible, that there is no longer any need for confessors, psychoanalysts, wardens, and the like. In this fully "panopticized" society, hierarchical, asymmetrical domination of some persons by others would have become superfluous; all would surveil and police themselves. The disciplinary norms would have become so thoroughly internalized that they would not be experienced as coming from without. The members of this society would, therefore, be autonomous. They would have appropriated the other as their own and made substance subject. Class domination would have given way to the kingdom of ends. The ideal speech situation would have been realized. But, it is claimed, this would not be freedom.

This picture of total, triumphant panopticism is held to be significant not empirically—as a prediction about the future course of historical development—but, rather, conceptually—for the new light it casts on the humanist ideals of autonomy and reciprocity. It suggests that these cannot, after all, be seen as genuinely oppositional ideals but are, rather, the very goals of disciplinary power. Conversely, it suggests that hierarchy and asymmetry are not, as humanists suppose, essential to that power but, rather, that they are only imperfections to be eliminated through further refinement. It suggests, therefore, that even Habermas's version of humanist ideals is internal to the disciplinary regime and devoid of critical, emancipatory force with respect to it. Thus, such ideals must be rejected on normative grounds.

Is this position defensible? Consider how a sophisticated Habermassian humanist might reply to the line of reasoning just sketched. Suppose she were to claim that what Foucault envisions as the realization of autonomous subjectivity is not that at all but only pseudoautonomy in conditions of pseudosymmetry; that despite appearances, the subject side and the object side do not really coincide yet; that the internalized other is still other; that self-surveillance is surveillance nonetheless and implies the hierarchical domination of one force by another; that the fact that everyone does it to herself or himself equally does not make it genuinely symmetrical self-rule of autonomous subjects.

I take it that a Habermassian humanist would be hard-pressed to make good such claims. By hypothesis, the members of the fully panopticized society are in an ideal speech situation, so that notion will have no critical force here. It will be necessary to invoke some other criterion to distinguish between "real" and "pseudo" autonomy, and it is not clear what such a criterion could possibly be.

Suppose, though, that the Habermassian humanist takes a different tack and grants Foucault his assumption of "real" autonomy and symmetry. Suppose that she simply digs in and says, "If that's discipline, I'm for it." This would be to concede that these humanist notions have no critical force with respect to the fully panopticized society. But it would also be to claim that this is no objection

to them, since there is no good reason to oppose such a society. Such a society seems objectionable only because Foucault has described it in a way that invites the genetic fallacy, that is, because he has made it the outcome of a historical process of hierarchical, asymmetrical coercion wherein people have been, in Nietzschean parlance, "bred" to autonomy. But this is a highly tendentious description. Why not describe it instead as a form of life developed on the basis of new, emergent communicative competences, competences that, though perhaps not built into the very logic of evolution, nonetheless permit for the first time in history the socialization of individuals oriented to dialogic political practice? Why not describe it as a form of life that is desirable since it no longer takes human needs and desires as brute, given facts to be either satisfied or repressed but takes them, rather, as accessible to intersubjective linguistic reinterpretation and transformation? Such access, after all, would widen the sphere of practical-political deliberation and narrow that of instrumental-technical control and manipulation.

This response shifts the burden of argument back onto Foucault. By claiming that panoptical autonomy is not the horror show Foucault took it to be, the Habermassian humanist challenges him to state, in terms independent of the vocabulary of humanism, exactly what is wrong with this hypothetical society and why it ought to be resisted. Moreover, it would not suffice for this purpose for Foucault merely to invoke such terms as 'subjection' and 'normalization'. To say that such a society is objectionable because it is normalizing is to say that it is conformist or represents the rule of *das Man:* this, in effect, would be to appeal to something like authenticity, which (as Derrida and perhaps even the later Heidegger himself understood) is simply another version of autonomy, albeit a detranscendentalized one.

Ultimately, then, a normative rejection of humanism will require appeal to some alternative, posthumanist, ethical paradigm capable of identifying objectionable features of a fully realized autonomous society. It will require, in other words, nothing less than a new paradigm of human freedom. Only from the standpoint of such a paradigm can Foucault or his interpreters make the case for a normative rejection of humanism.

Foucault, however, does not offer an alternative, posthumanist ethical paradigm. He does occasionally suggest that protest urged in the name of the pleasures of our bodies may have greater emancipatory potential than that made in the name of the ideal of autonomy. But he neither justifies nor elaborates this suggestion. Nor does he give us convincing reasons to believe that claims couched in some new "body language" would be any less subject to mystification and abuse than humanist claims have been (see Chapter 3 of this volume).

It looks, therefore, as though the reading of Foucault as a normative rejectionist of humanism pushes us to choose between a known ethical paradigm and an unknown x. As long as we keep the discussion on this moral-philosophical plane,

we are justified in siding with Habermas; we must balk at rejecting the idea of autonomy, at least until the Foucauldians fill in their x. But I suspect it will be more fruitful to hold off that conclusion for a while and to shift the debate onto a more hermeneutical and sociological plane. Let me rather recast the issue as a choice between two sets of fears or conceptions of danger.

Recall Foucault's nightmare of the fully panopticized society. Now consider that Habermas, too, describes a possible "brave new world" scenario for the future—but his version is the diametrical opposite of Foucault's. Habermas fears "the end of the individual," a form of life in which people are no longer socialized to demand rational, normative legitimations of social authority.[22] In this dystopian vision, they just cynically go along out of privatized strategic considerations, and the stance of communicative interaction in effect dies out.

Instead of asking which of these "brave new worlds" is the good one and which is the bad, we might ask which best captures our worst fears about contemporary social trends. But that question is too complex to be settled by exclusively moral-philosophical means. It is in part a question about empirical tendencies within contemporary Western societies and in part a question about the fears, and thus about the social identities and historical self-interpretations, of members of such societies. Hence, it is a question with an irreducible hermeneutical dimension: it demands that we weigh alternative ways of situating ourselves with respect to our past history and that we conceive ourselves in relation to possible futures, for example, as political agents and potential participants in oppositional social movements. To pose the issue in this way is to acknowledge the need for a *major* interdisciplinary, hermeneutical effort—an effort that brings to bear all the tools of historical, sociological, literary, philosophical, political, and moral deliberation in order to assess both the viability of our very strained and multivalent traditions and the possibilities of oppositional social movements. But once this is acknowledged, there is no assurance that such an effort can be contained within the terms of a choice between Habermas and Foucault.

This last point becomes especially salient when we consider that just such an interdisciplinary reassessment of humanism is now being undertaken by a social and intellectual movement without strong links to either Habermas or Foucault. I refer to the interdisciplinary community of feminist scholars and activists who are interrogating the concept of autonomy as a central value of male-dominated modern Western culture. Within this movement, a number of different perspectives on autonomy are being debated. At one end of the spectrum are those, like Simone de Beauvoir, who understand women's liberation precisely as securing our autonomy in the classical humanist sense.[23] At the other end are those, like Alison M. Jaggar, who reject autonomy on the grounds that it is an intrinsically masculinist value, premised on a mind-body, intellect-affect, will-nature dualism, linked to an invidious male-female dichotomy and positing woman (nature, affect, body) as the other to be mastered and suppressed.[24] In between are several

mediating positions. There are those, like Carol Gould, who argue that autonomy is only one-half of a fully human conception of freedom and the good life and that it must be supplemented with the "feminine" values of care and relatedness that humanist ideology has denigrated and repressed.[25] There are those, influenced by Carol Gilligan, who claim that we need to acknowledge that there are now in operation two (currently gender-associated) moralities with two different concepts of autonomy correlated with public life and private life, respectively.[26] And there are those, like Iris Young, who insist that the task is, rather, to overcome the split between those moralities and to sublate the opposition between autonomy and "femininity" or humanism and antihumanism.[27]

We cannot at present anticipate the outcome of these debates, but we can recognize their capacity to resituate, if not altogether to displace, the normative dimension of the Habermas-Foucault dispute. For the feminist interrogation of autonomy is the theoretical edge of a movement that is literally remaking the social identities and historical self-interpretations of large numbers of women and of some men. Insofar as the normative dispute between Habermas and Foucault is ultimately a hermeneutical question about such identities and interpretations, it cannot but be affected, perhaps even transformed, by these developments.

Has Foucault, then, given us good reasons to reject humanism on normative grounds? Strictly speaking, no. But with respect to the larger question of the viability of humanism as a normative ideal, the results are not yet in; not all quarters have been heard from.

4

Is Michel Foucault a "Young Conservative"? Has he demonstrated the superiority of a rejectionist critique of modernity over a dialectical one? The scorecard, on balance, looks roughly like this.

First, when Foucault is read as rejecting humanism exclusively on conceptual and philosophical grounds, Habermas's charge misses the mark. Foucault is not necessarily aspiring to a total break with modern values and forms of life just because he rejects a foundationalistic metainterpretation of them. Indeed, the project of de-Cartesianizing humanism is in principle a laudable one. But, on the other hand, it is understandable that Habermas should take the line that he has, since Foucault has not done the conceptual work required to elaborate and complete a merely philosophical rejection of humanism.

Second, when Foucault is read as rejecting humanism on strategic grounds, Habermas's charge is on target. Foucault has failed to establish that a pragmatic, de-Cartesianized humanism lacks critical force in the contemporary world. On the contrary, there are grounds for believing that such humanism is still efficacious, indeed doubly so. On the one hand, it tells against still-extant forms of premodern domination; on the other hand, it tells against the forms of administratively rationalized domination described in *Discipline and Punish*. Foucault has not, then, made the case for strategic rejectionism.

Finally, when Foucault is read as rejecting humanism on normative grounds, moral-philosophical considerations support Habermas's position. Without a nonhumanist ethical paradigm, Foucault cannot make good his normative case against humanism. He cannot answer the question, Why should we oppose a fully panopticized, autonomous society? And yet, it may turn out that there will be grounds for rejecting, or at least modifying and resituating, the ideal of autonomy. If feminists succeed in reinterpreting our history so as to link that ideal to the subordination of women, then Habermas's own normative paradigm will not survive unscathed. The broader question about the normative viability of humanism is still open.

All told, then, Michel Foucault is not a "Young Conservative." But neither has he succeeded in demonstrating the superiority of rejectionist over dialectical criticism of modern societies.

Notes

1. Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," *New German Critique* 22 (Winter 1981): 3–14.

2. Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," and "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Rereading *Dialectic of Enlightenment*," *New German Critique* 26 (Spring/Summer 1982): 13–30.

3. David C. Hoy, "Power, Repression, Progress: Foucault, Lukes, and the Frankfurt School," *Triquarterly* 52 (Fall 1981): 43–63, and "The Unthought and How to Think It" (American Philosophical Association, Western Division, 1982).

4. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago, 1982).

5. Hoy, "Power, Repression, Progress," and "The Unthought and How to Think It."

6. Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault*.

7. Martin Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics," in *The End of Philosophy*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York, 1973), 84–110, and "The Age of the World Picture," in *"The Question concerning Technology" and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York, 1977), 115–24.

8. Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics"; "The Age of the World Picture"; "The Question concerning Technology," in *"The Question concerning Technology" and Other Essays*, 3–35; and "The Letter on Humanism," trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York, 1977), 189–242.

9. Heidegger, "The Letter on Humanism."

10. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, trans. pub. (New York, 1973), and *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1979).

11. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, 1978), and "Truth and Subjectivity," Howison Lectures, University of California, Berkeley, 20–21 October 1980.

12. Foucault, *I, Pierre Rivière, Having Slaughtered My Mother, My Sister, and My Brother . . .: A Case of Parricide in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Frank Jellinek (New York, 1975), and *Her-*

culine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century French Hermaphrodite, trans. Richard McDougall (New York, 1980).

13. Hoy, "Power, Repression, Progress," and "The Unthought and How to Think It."

14. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), and "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," *Journal of Philosophy* 77, no. 9 (September 1980): 505–72; and Gerald Dworkin, "The Nature and Value of Autonomy" (1983).

15. Richard Rorty, "Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism," *Journal of Philosophy* 80 (October 1983): 583–89, and "Solidarity or Objectivity?" in *Post-Analytic Philosophy*, ed. John Rajchman and Cornel West (New York, 1985), 3–19; and Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York, 1983). For a discussion of Rorty, see my Chapter 5.

16. Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York, 1970).

17. See, for example, essays by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy in *Rejouer le politique* (Paris, 1982). For a discussion of this work, see my Chapter 4.

18. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston, 1975).

19. Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault*.

20. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1; "Truth and Subjectivity"; *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 2, *The Use of Pleasure*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, 1983); and *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 3, *The Care of the Self*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, 1986).

21. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977).

22. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*.

23. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. H. M. Parshley (New York, 1961).

24. Alison M. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (Totowa, N.J., 1983).

25. Carol Gould, "Private Rights and Public Virtues: Women, the Family, and Democracy," in *Beyond Domination*, ed. Gould (Totowa, N.J., 1983).

26. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982).

27. Iris Young, "Humanism, Gynocentrism, and Feminist Politics," *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy* 3, special issue of *Women's Studies International Forum* 8, no. 3 (1985): 173–85.

Chapter 3
Foucault's Body Language: A Posthumanist Political Rhetoric?

You grab the girl by the wrist. "Enough of these disguises, Lotaria! How long are you going to continue letting yourself be exploited by a police regime?"

This time Sheila-Ingrid-Corinna cannot conceal a certain uneasiness. She frees her wrist from your grasp. "I don't understand who you're accusing, I don't know anything about your stories. I follow a very clear strategy. The counterpower must infiltrate the mechanisms of power in order to overthrow it."

"And then reproduce it, identically! It's no use your camouflaging yourself, Lotaria! If you unbutton one uniform, there's always another uniform underneath!"

Sheila looks at you with an air of challenge.

"Unbutton . . . ? Just you try . . . "

Now that you have decided to fight, you can't draw back. With a frantic hand you unbutton the white smock of Sheila the programmer and you discover the police uniform of Alfonsina; you rip Alfonsina's gold buttons away and you find Corinna's anorak; you pull the zipper of Corinna and you see the chevrons of Ingrid . . .

It is she herself who tears off the clothes that remain on her. A pair of breasts appear, firm, melon-shaped, a slightly concave stomach, the full hips of a fausse maigre, a proud pubes, two long and solid thighs.

"And this? Is this a uniform?" Sheila exclaims.

You have remained upset. "No, this, no . . . " you murmur.

"Yes, it is!" Sheila cries. "The body is a uniform! The body is armed militia! The body is violent action! The body claims power! The body's at war! The body declares itself subject! The

> *body is an end and not a means! The body signifies!*
> *Communicates! Shouts! Protests! Subverts!''*
> —Italo Calvino, *If on a Winter's Night a Traveler*

A long and distinguished tradition of modern, normative social criticism and historical interpretation has developed around the humanist notions of autonomy, reciprocity, mutual recognition, dignity and human rights. These in turn depend, usually, upon a metaphysics of subjectivity. Clearly, the social thought of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Husserl, Sartre, and Habermas derives its normative force from such notions and (with the possible exceptions of Marx and Habermas) from such a metaphysics. Recently, however, Michel Foucault has offered a different sort of social criticism and historical interpretation, a ''posthumanist'' one, which explicitly rejects the metaphysics of subjectivity. For Foucault, the subject is merely a derivative product of a certain contingent, historically specific set of linguistically infused social practices that inscribe power relations upon bodies. Thus, there is no foundation, in Foucault's view, for critique oriented around the notions of autonomy, reciprocity, mutual recognition, dignity, and human rights. Indeed, Foucault rejects these humanist ideals as instruments of domination deployed within the current ''disciplinary power/knowledge regime.''

Whence, then, does Foucault's work, his description of ''the carceral society,'' for example, derive *its* critical force? How does Foucault make it look so ugly and menacing without appealing to the humanist ideals associated with the concept of the subject? Does he presuppose some alternative, posthumanist normative standpoint, and if so, what justifies *it?* Does he presuppose some alternative metaphysic, say, one of bodies? Or is his critique radically antifoundationalist, and if so, to what sort of justification can it lay claim?

Foucault himself is far from having a single, consistent position on these issues. But a number of things are nonetheless clear. He has not, in fact, elaborated any substantive, normative alternatives to humanism. Indeed, like some members of the Frankfurt school, he is openly suspicious of attempts to formulate a positive, theoretical basis for critique. He assumes that such efforts are implicitly totalitarian because totalizing, that they must be normalizing because normative.[1] But even as he rejects the project of a new, posthumanist *moral theory,* Foucault in effect proclaims the need for a new *vocabulary* or *rhetoric* of social criticism.[2] To continue to use the modern humanist vocabulary and rhetoric is, he claims, to enhance and perpetuate the very form of life he wishes to oppose. Hence, the need for a new *critical paradigm.*

It is the project of a critique without traditional normative foundations, a critique rooted in a postmodern *rhetoric* rather than in a postmodern *theory,* that I wish to explore here. I shall do so by means of an examination of some rather unsystematic remarks of Foucault's, remarks that in effect sketch some requirements for a new critical paradigm and suggest, albeit in a very tentative and abstract fashion, what such a paradigm might look like. I shall focus, in other words, on that strand of his thought that is not content simply to be humanism's own immanent counterdiscourse—its critical, self-reflective conscience, as it were—but that aspires rather to ''transgress'' or transcend humanism and to replace it with something new.[3] The interesting result of these considerations, to give away the ending, is that in the light of all the difficulties exposed, good old-fashioned modern humanism, or some properly detranscendentalized version thereof, comes to appear increasingly attractive.

Let me begin by noting that it is one thing to criticize an entrenched political vocabulary and another to stop using it. Not only does Foucault not elaborate a substantive postmodern alternative to humanism, he continues to make tacit use of the same humanist rhetoric he claims to be rejecting and delegitimating. *Discipline and Punish,* for example, even as it indicts humanist reform for complicity in disciplinary power, depends for its *own* critical force on the reader's familiarity with and commitment to the modern ideals of autonomy, reciprocity, dignity, and human rights.[4] What else but one's attachment to such notions—at least as the ideals of one's culture, if not as the unavoidable foundational categories of moral reflection per se—explains the revulsion generated by Foucault's graphic depiction of processes for the production of ''docile-useful bodies''?

Now, the fact that Foucault continues to speak (or at least to murmur) the language of humanism need not be held against him. Every good Derridean will allow that there is not, at least for the time being, any other language he could speak. Wary, perhaps, of the dangers of the ''false sortie,''[5] Foucault himself acknowledges that he cannot simply and straightaway discard at will the normative notions associated with the metaphysics of subjectivity. He admits that

> When today one wants to object in some way to the disciplines and all the effects of power and knowledge that are linked to them, what is it that one does, concretely, in real life . . . if not precisely appeal to this canon of right, this famous, formal right, that is said to be bourgeois, and which in reality is the right of sovereignty?[6]

But even as he cannot help but have recourse to the rhetoric of ''right'' against discipline, Foucault is not content with it. He claims that it is inadequate for several reasons. First, the rights vocabulary is foundationalistic; it purports to be ''Morality's Own Language,'' to paraphrase Richard Rorty, to be grounded, that is, in ''the nature of persons as they really are in themselves'' apart from their participation in contingent, historically specific regimes of social practices. This inadequacy might be corrigible were it not also the case, according to Foucault, that rights talk functions in contemporary society as a language of mystification, obscuring the actual processes of social domination and helping to produce the subjects of those processes.

Foucault's account of the mystificatory functioning of humanist rhetoric depends upon some assumptions about historical temporality that help define his *own* project of a posthumanist political rhetoric. These assumptions come to light in the curious fact that he charges rights rhetoric with two seemingly mutually contradictory offenses.

On the one hand, right is not the proper normative standard for the critical thematization of discipline because it is *anachronistic*. It harks back to an earlier period in which power had not yet become thoroughly diffused throughout the entire social body via everyday, disciplinary micropractices. Thus, Foucault holds that the psychoanalytic critique of fascism, however admirable, was "in the last analysis a historical 'retrovision'," because it was couched in the categories of law, right, and sovereignty.[7]

But on the other hand, Foucault *also* rejects the standard of right (or "sovereignty," as he sometimes calls it) on the grounds that it is precisely *contemporary* with the disciplinary regime and, thus, is internal to and complicit with it. He says,

> It is not through recourse to sovereignty against discipline that the effects of disciplinary power can be limited, because sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms are two absolutely integral constituents of the general mechanism of power in our society.[8]

It is no doubt this rejection of contemporaneous critique that is in play when Foucault intimates that Marxism may be inadequate because it opposes the regime of "bio-power" in the latter's own terms, to wit, in the name of "life."[9]

Of course, Foucault cannot, strictly speaking, have it both ways and hold that right is simultaneously anachronistic to and contemporary with discipline. In fact, he reconciles the apparent contradiction by claiming that modern power operates through precisely this heterogeneity between the disciplinary practices and the atavistic ideological and juridical organization of right. Right, in other words, exactly because it is *anachronistic*, has the *contemporary* ideological function of masking disciplinary domination and thus contributes to it.

But be that as it may, what is important here is that Foucault wants to rule out in principle any critical paradigm that is either anachronistic to or contemporary with the regime it is to critique. Neither the vocabulary of the past nor that of the present is adequate. Clearly, this leaves only the vocabulary of the future. Foucault seems to assume that an adequate critique of discipline must await the appearance of an entirely new political rhetoric, which in his scheme of things is tantamount to a new moral vision.

> If one wants to look for a non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to a struggle against disciplines and disciplinary power, . . . one should turn . . . towards the possibility of a new form of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from the principle of sovereignty.[10]

This puts Foucault in a position similar to that of the later Heidegger, the position of awaiting an *Ereignis* revealing a new direction of cultural development utterly discontinuous with the dying one of modern humanism. But since Foucault does not share Heidegger's critique of the will, his brand of "waiting" is not one of essentially passive receptivity ("Only a God can save us now") but, rather, one of multiple local resistances carried out in the name of no articulable positive ideals. It seems, then, that Foucault's assumptions about historical temporality and critique condemn him to a politics of negation.

But Foucault does make one rather tentative move to go beyond this stance of place-holding resistance while waiting for the dawning of a new postdisciplinary, posthumanist standard of right. He drops an occasional hint as to what such a standard might look like or at least as to where one might appropriately be sought. These hints are puzzling, however, because the alternative they suggest seems vulnerable to precisely the sorts of objections that in Foucault's eyes vitiated humanism: it seems to involve a retreat from antifoundationalism and a turn toward a new metaphysics—one of bodies—and it may be no less subject to cooptation and mystification than Foucault claims humanist critique has been.

Foucault concludes the first volume of his *History of Sexuality* with the suggestion that "the rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures."[11] The reasons for the rejection of "sex-desire" are the characteristic deconstructive and demystifying ones. "Sex," according to Foucault, is a fictitious object invented in the late eighteenth century that functions as an instrument of domination in the regime of bio-power. It did not exist until the modern power/knowledge regime

> group[ed] together, in an artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations and pleasures, and . . . [made] use of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere.[12]

Sex has a role in the modern regime as an epistemic object and a target of power; it justifies asymmetrical procedures of coercion and intimidation and induces the formation of habits of *self*-surveillance and *self*-policing. But sex corresponds to nothing apart from this role. It simply *is* this role, an object-within-a-set-of-practices.

Of course, in this respect sex is no different from anything else in Foucault's scheme of things. Absolutely everything is socially constructed in his view. But not everything is "fictitious" in the way that sex is. What is different about sex is that, unlike many other objects-within-practices, it purports to refer to a transcendent entity existing apart from, and identifiable independently of, any social

practices whatsoever. 'Sex,' then, is the name a particular historical power regime gives to an illusory object that it posits as existing outside all power regimes and as subject to repression and distortion by them. Sex, therefore, is an illusory object through which the current regime channels protest so as to integrate and feed that protest into the mechanisms of its own functioning. Protests in the name of sex merely continue to articulate the organization of sexuality proper to the regime. "We must not think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power; on the contrary, one tracks along the course laid out by the general deployment of sexuality."[13]

In a fashion that parallels his treatment of "Man" and the subject, then, Foucault rejects "sex-desire" as a normative category on two analytically distinct but functionally interrelated counts: (1) it is foundationalistic, and (2) it is an instrument of domination. As he did in the case of "Man" and the subject, Foucault assumes that this means that sex is an instrument of domination *tout court,* that it has no critical, emancipatory force vis-à-vis the current regime.

Instead, Foucault suggests resistance in the name of "bodies and pleasures." But how does this standard escape the difficulties that plagued sex-desire? It must be that either the body-pleasure notion is not fictitious in the way that sex is or that it does not function as an instrument of domination within the current deployment of sexuality.

What could it mean to say that bodies are not fictitious in the way that sex is? Could it be that Foucault exempts bodies from his general thesis that everything is interpretation all the way down? Could it be, in other words, that he holds that the body is not simply an object-within-a-regime-of-practices but is, rather, a transcendental signified?

There is some evidence for this reading in *Discipline and Punish* in Foucault's claim that however various penal practices constitute or institute their respective objects, it is always really the body that is being punished. When the sovereign tortures malefactors' bodies, when the reformers rehabilitate juridical subjects, when the disciplinarians normalize deviants, all are in fact applying force to bodies. It is always the body that is contested.

But if indeed Foucault does hold the view that the body is a transcendental signified and if it is for *this* reason that he claims that bodies are the appropriate basis for postmodern political critique, how does he himself avoid the sort of foundationalism for which he attacks humanism?

In fact, Foucault does not identify any positive characteristics of bodies "as they really are in themselves" apart from the ways in which they are historically "invested." Nor does he derive any universal normative political ideals from this putative suprahistorical corporeality. On the contrary, he calls his project the study of the history of the political technology of the body. He insists that this is neither the history of what people have said and thought about the body nor that of some identical, selfsame referent prior to history. Rather, it is a history of the

politically and historically invested body, of the distinctive ways in which various successive power/knowledge regimes institute the body as an object within their respective techniques and practices. For example, there is the tortured body of the *ancien régime,* the object of the "art of unbearable sensations"; then there is the mechanical, analyzable body of Galilean science, the object of calculable spatiotemporal forces and motions; and there is also the natural, organic body of discipline, the trainable, manipulable object of *dressage* and eventually the "docile-useful body."

Clearly, none of these is the body *simpliciter.* Rather, each is the body already invested with some historically specific form of power. Indeed, the notion of the body *simpliciter,* as a substratum prior to power, upon which power inscribes its figures, drops out of the picture altogether. That sort of body would be merely another version of the *Ding-an-sich,* since it can never be encountered and has no identifiable properties whatsoever. Foucault's antifoundationalism requires him to reject such a notion. He cannot consistently appeal to it either to ground a posthumanist political vision or to justify his historical interpretations.

If this is so, one may ask, With what right does Foucault continue to speak of the body *simpliciter* at all? What justifies him in calling his work a history of the political technology of "*the* body"? What justifies his assumption that the various invested bodies just mentioned are all species of the same genus? If there is no identifiable common referent underlying them all, why organize the material in this way, and why give the body any special role in political critique?

In order to avoid an ill-advised retreat from his antifoundationalist position to a metaphysical one, Foucault should probably answer these questions as a pragmatist would. He should say that although there is no *ontological* basis for organizing his discourse about the succession of power/knowledge regimes in terms of how they institute bodies as opposed to in some other terms, there *is* a *pragmatic* basis, in that such discourse provides critical insights that help us cope. It is, in that sense, the most efficacious discourse for thematizing the problematic of emancipation in modern societies.

But if the claim in *Discipline and Punish* that it is really always a question of bodies boils down, in effect, to the claim that "body language" has greater emancipatory potential than the alternatives, then we need to ask whether this latter claim is really so. Is "body language" really more efficacious than "rights language" or "desires language" or "needs-and-interests language"?

Foucault's reply will no doubt be that rights language and the others function as instruments of domination within the disciplinary power regime, whereas body language does not. But addressing the first half of this reply, one can say that even if rights talk does so function, it does not follow that it is wholly inefficacious or devoid of critical force. Foucault himself has cited cases in which opposition groups have appropriated entrenched vocabularies for their own purposes and turned them against those who had used them to exclude and oppress.

He notes, for example, that those disqualified as "perverts" in the vocabulary of the new nineteenth-century *scientia sexualis* defended their legitimacy in a counterdiscourse employing some of that vocabulary's own terms.[14] Now, if a "strategic reversal" was possible in that case, why might not something similar occur in the case of rights talk? Why does Foucault dismiss such a possibility out of hand? Why does he assume that rights talk has no emancipatory potential whatsoever, that it is reducible without remainder to its putative current mystificatory function?

Perhaps Foucault believes that the track record of humanist rhetoric is so miserable as to be compromised beyond all possibility of redemption. But if so, might not one dispute his historiography? Surely, one need be neither a Whiggish proponent of the ideology of progress nor a foundationalistic positivist in matters of epistemology in order to doubt that he has done justice to the "emancipatory moment" in the history of humanism. In any event, the decision on whether to reject rights rhetoric surely demands both a more judicious weighing of such considerations than Foucault gives us and an examination of the available alternatives.

This brings me to the second half of the claim that I have just attributed to Foucault, namely, that body language does not currently function as an instrument of disciplinary domination. This is no doubt true, but only trivially so: since no one now speaks this body language, it has *no* function, domination-engendering or otherwise, in the current regime. It therefore satisfies Foucault's requirement that an adequate critical rhetoric or paradigm be radically external or future-situated. But this only shows, in my view, how insufficient—indeed, how bizarre—Foucault's criterion is, for the same thing could be said of any of an indefinitely large number of other currently unspoken, unborn languages. What justifies the suggestion that the one having to do with bodies and their pleasures is the one we now need? Why does *it* in particular seem promising as an antidisciplinary strategem?

One way to answer this question is to appeal to the tactical value of body language as a counter to the "ideophilia" of humanist culture.[15] The rhetoric of bodies and pleasures, in other words, can be said to be useful for exposing and opposing, in highly dramatic fashion, the undue privilege modern western culture has accorded subjectivity, sublimation, ideality, and the like. But this is to treat Foucault's suggestion as a flashy strategic ploy aiming to *épater les bourgeois*. Unless more can be said about the uses of body talk for thematizing at least some of the major social and political issues of the day—issues such as the prospects for democratic, nonbureaucratic, nonauthoritarian socialism; the ecological crisis; scientism, technologism, and the deformation of public life; sexism, racism, homophobia, national and religious chauvinisms; the relations between modern and traditional cultures; disarmament; mass culture; the family; poverty—unless body talk can speak in some way to these, Foucault's proposal might understandably be thought jejune.

What, then, might body language better permit us to say and do about such things than the vocabulary of humanism can? Here is where my capacity to imagine a plausible Foucauldian response runs out. I can form no concrete picture of what resistance to the deployment of sexuality in the regime of bio-power in the name of bodies and their pleasures would be like. Or, to the extent that I can, it is one that, by the most ironic of coincidences, resembles the hedonistic utilitarianism of the very architect of panopticism himself, Jeremy Bentham. Still more troubling, though, is the thought that since the disciplinary deployment of sexuality has, according to Foucault, produced its own panoply of bodily pleasures (including those associated with the sadomasochistic, hunter-prey, cat-and-mouse scenarios described in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*)—since, in other words, disciplinary power has thoroughly marked the only bodies that we potential protesters have—it is not clear how claims in the name of the pleasures of our bodies would have any greater critical leverage on the regime than, say, claims in the name of the rights traditionally recognized but *not generally realized* in modern Western culture.

Indeed, it probably follows from Foucault's own antifoundationalistic assumptions that there is no normative archimedean point for political critique. No vocabulary whatsoever is intrinsically immune from all possibility of co-optation and misuse. To abandon as illusory the philosophical quest for Morality's Own Language is to admit that, given the right circumstances, any normative concept, emancipatory ideal, or political rhetoric can, might, and likely will be used as an instrument of domination.[16] And by the same token, it is to recognize that no critical paradigm need be reduced without remainder to that status, since "strategic reversals" are sometimes possible. The moral here is that claims couched in the language of the pleasures of our bodies are no more intrinsically immune from co-optation and abuse than are claims made in any other vocabulary. Their capacity to generate critical leverage and escape co-optation is entirely relative to their situation.

It seems, then, that the best one can do now is to take a hard look at Foucault's social critique and ask straightforwardly, What is it, after all, that strikes us as objectionable about the regime of discipline and bio-power so graphically depicted there? Can we sum up our objections more efficaciously by saying that panoptical practices and the like produce an offensive economy of bodies and pleasures or by saying that they fail to respect the rights that express our sense of how persons ought to be treated?

I suspect that the second formulation will strike most people as more trenchant. Most people will object to the modern power regime on the grounds that (1) it objectifies people and negates the autonomy one usually prefers to accord them, and that (2) it is premised upon hierarchical and asymmetrical relations

and negates the reciprocity and mutuality usually valued in human relations. But to put matters thus is to suggest that there may after all be some emancipatory potential surviving in humanism. It is to suggest the possibility of the sort of immanent critique that consists in condemning the institutions of a culture for their failure to realize its own widely accepted ideals.

Yet it may be argued that what strikes most people as more trenchant is not the last word. I concede that there is something disturbingly conservative in this approach. The objections just formulated are couched in the vocabulary of modern Western normative theory, and the intuitions that support them are not innocent of that theory and that tradition. On the contrary, these intuitions are themselves saturated with the presuppositions of the last several centuries of our culture. It seems question-begging, therefore, to take them as the standard when what is to be decided is the desirability of a revolution in political culture that would result in some major restructuring of our intuitions, presuppositions, and vocabulary. It seems, in other words, overly tendentious to assume that we will or should retain our current standards.

But once we have recognized this problem, there is no getting around the fact that our current standards are the only ones we currently have. It is true that we may not be stuck with them forever, that a revolution in political culture may occur (although, of course, there is no guarantee that that would be an improvement—by *whomever's* standards). But in the absence of such a revolution—which is to say in the absence of some positive, concrete, palpable alternative social vision or exemplar capable of winning our loyalty and restructuring our way of seeing—the standards we have are the standards we have. This is so however reflexively self-conscious we are about the fact that it is *we* who have them. So when someone who offers no convincingly articulated alternative comes along and tells us that our attempts to critique discipline in terms of humanism testify only to our immersion in the disciplinary matrix and in fact are moves deployed to articulate and strengthen that matrix, a healthy dose of skepticism is in order—provided, of course, that such skepticism does not degenerate into the sort of blind adherence to tradition that rules out receptivity to new critical paradigms, if and when these emerge.

If this conclusion seems unduly hard on Foucault, it might be well to recall that it follows from an analysis of one strand of his thought only—the strand that aspires to "transgress" or transcend humanism and replace it with something new. It is this "transgressive" Foucault who appears to lack genuine political seriousness, to be wanting in the theoretical, lexical, and critical resources necessary to sustain a viable political vision.

But to leave matters thus would be to ignore the *other* strand of Foucault's thought—the strand that in effect constitutes humanism's own immanent counterdiscourse or critical conscience. This is the strand that aspires less to overthrow humanism than to keep it honest. It offers no solutions of its own but only

an extremely keen nose for sniffing out hypocrisy, cant, and self-deception, on the one hand, and the historical logic whereby "modes of humanistic knowledge and practice escape the good intentions of their formulators and supporters, on the other."[17] This is the muckraking, Socratic Foucault, the Foucault who has done more, perhaps, than anyone since Marx to expose and warn against the enormous variety of ways in which humanist rhetoric has been and is liable to misuse and co-optation. To *this* Foucault we owe a profound debt of gratitude.

But even this more evenhanded conclusion may not seem entirely satisfactory. Despite (or perhaps because of) its eminent reasonableness, one might feel uneasy with an interpretation that subdivides Foucault in this way and selects out for approval only that portion of his thought that is, to put a Derridean gloss on it, recuperable within the humanist closure. One might, in other words, wish to find some way of better appreciating the *un*recuperable Foucault.

Two possibilities suggest themselves. First, one could follow Derrida further and see the immanentist Foucault and the transgressive Foucault as two phases of a deconstructive "double gesture." The nonidentity of these phases would then be the "interval" marking the text as the sort of "bifurcated writing" necessary to "*dis*place" (rather than *re*place) humanism.[18] Intriguing as this is, it is unclear what the political implications of such a reading would be. Is displacement reform? Revolution? Or some third, new, possibility? Does it mean that the immanentist Foucault is simply a tactic deployed in the service, ultimately, of the transgressive Foucault? And if so, do not all of the foregoing objections to the latter reassert themselves?

There is perhaps another, simpler way in which one might appreciate the unrecuperable Foucault. One might take a hint from Susan Sontag, who writes:

> Great writers are either husbands or lovers. Some writers supply the solid virtues of a husband: reliability, intelligibility, generosity, decency. There are other writers in whom one prizes the gifts of a lover, gifts of temperament rather than of moral goodness. Notoriously, women tolerate qualities in a lover—moodiness, selfishness, unreliability, brutality—that they would never countenance in a husband, in return for excitement, an infusion of intense feeling. In the same way, readers put up with unintelligibility, obsessiveness, painful truths, lies, bad grammar—if, in compensation, the writer allows them to savor rare emotions and dangerous sensations. And, as in life, so in art both are necessary, husbands and lovers. It's a great pity when one is forced to choose between them.[19]

Foucault, one might conclude, isn't much good as a husband; one wouldn't want, politically speaking, to cohabit with him indefinitely. But he makes a very interesting lover indeed. His very outrageousness in refusing standard humanist virtues, narrative conventions, and political categories provides just the jolt we oc-

casionally need to dereify our usual patterns of self-interpretation and renew our sense that, just possibly, they may not tell the whole story.

Notes

1. Foucault himself does not explicitly argue these assumptions. However, his teacher, Georges Canguilhem, attempted to demonstrate an internal relation between the normative and the normalizing in medicine; see *Le normal et le pathologique* (Paris, 1966). Why such a relation should be thought to hold more generally has not, to my knowledge, been plausibly articulated.

2. The centrality of rhetoric, as opposed to epistemology and ethics, in Foucault's project has been noted by Hayden White; see his "Michel Foucault," in *Structuralism and Since: From Lévi-Strauss to Derrida*, ed. John Sturrock (Oxford, 1979). The contrast between a moral *vocabulary* and a moral *theory* is developed by Richard Rorty in "Method, Social Science, and Social Hope," in *Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972–1980* (Minneapolis, 1982).

3. The distinction between these two strands in Foucault's thought was impressed upon me as a result of James Bernauer's comments on an earlier draft of this paper read at a meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy on 29 October 1981 in Evanston, Illinois. Professor Bernauer's comments emphasized what I call the strand of "immanentism" in Foucault, whereas my paper emphasizes what I call the "transgressive" strand. Clearly, both are present in Foucault. I shall return to the contrast between them at the end of the paper.

4. I argue this thesis in "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions"; see Chapter 1 of this volume.

5. The "false sortie" is Jacques Derrida's expression for the abstract and premature effort whereby one catapults oneself outside the metaphysical closure only to end up reproducing it; see "The Ends of Man," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 30, no. 1 (September 1969): 56.

6. Foucault, "Two Lectures," in *Power/Knowledge*, ed. Colin Gordon trans. Gordon et al. (New York, 1980), 108.

7. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, 1978), 150.

8. Foucault, "Two Lectures," 108.

9. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 144–45.

10. Foucault, "Two Lectures," 108.

11. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 157.

12. Ibid. 154.

13. Ibid. 156.

14. Ibid. 134. The example and the general point are found in Jonathan Arac, "The Function of Foucault at the Present Time," *Humanities in Society*, 3, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 73–86.

15. I owe this term to James Bernauer (see n. 3 above). The point was also suggested to me by Hayden White.

16. See Richard Rorty, "Method, Social Science, and Social Hope."

17. Bernauer; see n. 3 above.

18. See Derrida, "Positions: Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta," in *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1981), 41–42.

19. Susan Sontag, "Camus' *Notebooks*," in *"Against Interpretation" and Other Essays* (New York, 1966), 52. I am grateful to Martin Jay for calling this passage to my attention.